Job applicants with criminal records are much less likely than others to obtain legitimate employment. Recent efforts to address this problem include both efforts to persuade employers voluntarily to hire ex-offenders and legislation, including Ban the Box laws. The success of any remedial strategy depends on whether employer concerns are founded on an accurate view of how ex-offenders behave on the job if hired. Little empirical evidence now exists to answer this question. This paper attempts to fill this gap by examining firm-level hiring practices and workerlevel performance outcomes. Our data indicate that individuals with criminal records have a much longer tenure and are less likely to quit their jobs voluntarily than other workers. Some results, however, differ by job: customer service employees with a criminal record are no more likely than others to leave for reasons of misconduct, but sales people are. We find some evidence that psychometric testing might provide a substitute for the use of criminal records, but that it would not in our own sample. This complex pattern suggests the need for expanding the public policy menu beyond Ban the Box to include incentives to encourage employers to look more closely at their workforces to identify where the true risk groups are.
Introduction
Job applicants with criminal records are much less likely than others to receive an offer of employment. Recent audit studies suggest that lower human capital does not fully explain this difference, and that employers apply a hiring penalty to job applicants with a criminal record.
The poor employment prospects of ex-offenders are of considerable policy concern, in part because a failure to obtain legitimate employment is one of the strongest correlates of criminal recidivism. Recent legislation and initiatives have attempted to improve the labor market prospects of ex-offenders. One approach, known as Ban the Box, would restrict or prohibit employer inquiries about an applicant's criminal record until a conditional offer of employment has been made. Alternative approaches include attempts to encourage voluntary efforts by employers either through persuasion or incentives.
The success of any approach to improve the employment prospects of those with a criminal record depends on why firms impose a hiring penalty. Are employers primarily concerned with potential workplace misconduct or are they using a criminal record as a proxy for the personality characteristics of a job instability or poor performance? Is either fear founded on an accurate view of how ex-offenders behave on the job if they are hired?
Little empirical evidence now exists to answer these questions. This paper attempts to fill this gap by analyzing these issues from the perspective of firm-level hiring practices and workerlevel performance outcomes. Our data is drawn from the client firms of a hiring consultancy whose data has been previously used in academic work (Burks et al. 2015) . The data consists of observations of individual job applicants and employees for low skill white collar jobs, primarily at call centers. The data includes information available at the time of hiring, such as criminal record and job qualifications, and for those hired it contains tenure-related outcomes such as length of service and, if the employee separated, the circumstances.
Our data indicate that individuals with criminal records have a much longer tenure and are less likely to quit their jobs voluntarily than other workers. However, disaggregating by position suggests the need for caution in drawing general conclusions. We find that customer service employees with a criminal record are no more likely than others to leave their job involuntarily or for reasons of misconduct. However, sales people with a record do appear more likely to be terminated because of misconduct.
On the whole, our results provide support for efforts to expand hiring of applicants with a criminal record, but one qualification is critical. We confirm the result of previous studies that employers apply a hiring penalty to individuals with criminal records. Those who are actually hired are presumably more qualified than those who are not, and the instances in which we find better performance of employees with a criminal record cannot be generalized to the entire pool. However, we believe we can make some reasonable inferences about marginal hires with a criminal record, and our results suggest that some employers could be missing profitable opportunities to hire workers whose turnover would be lower. We also note that observational work on this issue may have to suffice for quite some time: conducting a field experiment that would examine the entire applicant pool is difficult because of employer fear of applicants with a criminal record. With appropriate caution, we thus believe that our results have some relevance to public and employer policy towards hiring ex-offenders.
Our key finding is that employees with a criminal record perform as well or better than those without a record in some jobs, while exhibiting higher levels of misconduct discharge in others. This result raises a number of further questions. Are different performance outcomes driven by differences in employee characteristics or in job characteristics? Are there any characteristics that predict which applicants with criminal records are at risk, reducing or eliminating the value of criminal record information in hiring?
We examine these questions using psychometric test results of the type commonly used in hiring. Our results suggest two interesting hypotheses for future research. First, we find striking differences between the psychometric predictors of poor outcomes in sales jobs and customer service jobs. Second we find psychometric differences between sales people and customer service workers with criminal records. These results suggest that bad outcomes for sales people with records may be driven either by differences in either worker or job characteristics. Whether job or workers characteristics are causal cannot be ascertained from our data. Second, in theory psychometric testing might provide a mechanism to allow employers to ignore criminal records entirely by testing directly for the characteristics that cause difficulties in a subset of employees with criminal records. In our data, we find that the psychometric variables have a reasonable degree of association with both a criminal record and job outcomes. However, they do not reduce the value of a criminal record, and further research is required to determine whether they could do so.
This complex set of findings has equally complex implications for policy. All Ban the Box laws force employers to assess applicants initially without the potentially distorting lens of a criminal record. Our study may provide some qualified support for these laws: it suggests that employers might find it profitable to hire more ex-offenders for customer service jobs, so perhaps they are not accurately assessing the costs and benefits of these applicants. Yet some Ban the Box laws go further and restrict the uses that an employer can make of a criminal record even at the final stages of the hiring process. Our finding of elevated misconduct risk in some positions provides reason for concern about mandatory restrictions on consideration of criminal records. More generally, our study suggests that the policy menu should be broadened beyond Ban the Box to reduce disincentives related to liability for negligent hiring and to create incentives for employers to look closely at their own workforce to identify where any risks actually are.
Related Literature
Observational studies have repeatedly found that job applicants with criminal records are much less likely than others to obtain legitimate employment (Western, Kling, and Weiman 2001) . Six months or so after release, 50 to 80 percent of the formerly incarcerated are not employed in the legitimate labor market (Visher, Debus, and Yahner 2008; Petersilia 2003) .
Establishing whether a causal relation exists between a criminal record and poor employment prospects is difficult, but studies using a variety of methods suggest that traditional human capital measures alone do not explain the hiring penalty associated with a criminal record, and that employers consider a criminal record a liability in job applicants.
2 Survey evidence confirms these findings, and indicates that 69 percent of organizations conduct criminal background checks on all of their job candidates (Holzer, Raphael and Stoll 2004 ; Society for Human Resource Management 2012).
The poor employment prospects of ex-offenders are of considerable policy concern. Technological changes continue to make background checking easier, and evidence suggests that lower costs have driven the increased use of these checks. (Bushway 2004; Finlay 2009 ). The incarceration rate in the United States has grown considerably over the past several decades and now far exceeds that of any other country in the world. Over 650,000 offenders are released from prison each year (Carson and Golinelli 2013) . The post-release employment prospects of inmates are of great practical consequence. Over half of released prisoners are reconvicted within three years (Durose, Cooper, and Snyder 2014) . A failure to obtain legitimate employment is one of the strongest correlates of criminal recidivism, and recent evidence suggests that this relation may be causal (Uggen and Shannon 2014; Yang 2016) .
Recent legislation and initiatives have attempted to improve the labor market prospects of ex-offenders. Some approaches restrict the use that employers can make of a criminal record. Ban the Box statutes prohibit employer inquiries about an applicant's criminal record until a conditional offer of employment has been made, and sometimes restrict the type of records that can be used or allow the employer to withdraw the offer only if certain conditions are met. 3 The EEOC has challenged criminal background checks on the grounds that they have a disparate impact on African Americans, and encourages employers to meet the requirements of disparate impact doctrine by procedures similar to those in Ban the Box laws. 4 Alternative policy approaches attempt to encourage voluntary employer efforts. The Obama administration launched an initiative called "Take the Fair Chance Pledge." Businesses and educational institutions have been asked to commit to employing fairly those with a criminal record. Over 100 organizations in a variety of industries have signed on, including such companies as American Airlines, Coca-Cola, Koch Industries, Google, Starbucks, and Walmart.
5 Related policies attempt to provide incentives or remove disincentives for hiring people with criminal records. The Work Opportunity Tax Credit allows employers to reduce their federal income tax liability by $2,400 for hiring ex-felons within one year after their conviction or release from prison. 6 An employer who hires an applicant with a criminal record faces a double risk: the employee's criminal record will preclude the employer from obtaining private insurance against misconduct, and if the employee commits a wrongdoing on the job that harms another individual, the criminal record is generally admissible as evidence of negligence. To address this, the Federal Bonding Program provides limited bonding for some employers during the first six months of an 3 For example, Hawaii requires that a conviction record bear a rational relationship to the duties and responsibilities of the position and only allows the use of records less than ten years old. Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 378-2.5 (Supp. 2007). Minnesota also allows a record to be used only if it "directly relates" to the position. Minn. Stat. § 364. New York and Wisconsin also prohibit employment discrimination against those with a criminal record unless an employer can show that a person with a propensity for the kind of crime the prospective employee had previously committed would be unable to successfully perform the relevant job. Wis. Stat. § 111.325-111.335 (2003) Yet another approach attempts to improve the employability of people with criminal records by identifying those at low risk for recidivism 9 or improving human capital through job training or services directed toward individual change (Visher et al. 2016) .
These policies are based on widely varying assumptions about the nature and accuracy of the business rationale for the hiring penalty. Employers often claim to use criminal records primarily from concern about liability for negligent hiring.
10 Fewer state, when asked, that they are using criminal records as evidence regarding the personality characteristics they seek. However, studies have found that employers understate their overall willingness to hire exoffenders (Pager and Quillian 2005) , and in surveys they may well de-emphasize reasons for nonhiring that they perceived as socially disfavored, such as using criminal records as a personality proxy.
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If little is known about exactly why employers use criminal records, still less is known about whether this use is based on accurate assumptions about how those with criminal records perform once hired or whether there are general characteristics that explain why employees with criminal records are at higher risk of bad job outcomes. Our paper aims to shed some light on these issues.
Only one other paper examines the job performance of people with criminal records. Lundquist, Pager, Strader (2016) compare the performance of felons and non-felons using data drawn from the military. Like us, Lundquist et al (2016) find that military personnel with a felony record are more attached to the job than other personnel and appear better on some performance dimensions, though different ones than we use. In contrast to our results, they find weaker performance and retention among those with a history of lesser offenses. On the other hand, Lundquist et al (2016) provide an extensive qualitative analysis of selection procedures but not an estimate of the hiring penalty, while we provide an estimate of the hiring penalty with less institutional detail regarding the hiring process itself. We thus view the two papers as complementary, examining different labor markets, civilian and military, and providing different perspectives on the selection process. 7 Federal Bonding Program, Answers to Questions About Fidelity Bonding, (accessed Sept. 28, 2016) , http://www.bonds4jobs.com/highlights.html. 8 The most comprehensive protection is provided by Texas. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem., §142 .002 which provides that "[a] cause of action may not be brought against an employer, general contractor, premises owner, or other third party solely for negligently hiring or failing to adequately supervise an employee, based on evidence that the employee has been convicted of an offense.".
9 Some states, such as Florida, disallow the use at any time of expunged records and permit job candidates to lie if asked. Fla. Stat. ch. § 943.0585 4(a). Most states have procedures that attempt to identify ex-offenders who have been rehabilitated and either expunge their records or grant a Certificate of Good Conduct, which leaves their conviction standing but testifies to their rehabilitation since that time (Jacobs 2015, 143-49) .
10 Surveys suggest that employers consider criminal records to reduce legal liability for negligent hiring (52 percent); to ensure a safe work environment for employees (49 percent); to reduce theft and other criminal activity (38 percent); to comply with laws requiring checks (28 percent); and to assess the overall trustworthiness of a candidate (17 percent) (Society for Human Resource Management 2012).
11 The continued importance of character proxy use may be indicated by a recent Supreme Court case that accepted a defendant's argument that questions about illegal drug use are a useful way of determining which employees will "'efficiently and effectively' discharge their duties " NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2011) (upholding the constitutionality of government use of criminal background checks absent any specific statutory prohibition).
Somewhat more evidence bears on the personality characteristics of those with criminal records and the value of personality in predicting work outcomes. Psychologists define personality as "enduring patterns of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and oneself that are exhibited in a wide range of social and personal contexts" (American Psychiatric Association and others 2013, Glossary). In the last 20 years, the most frequently used framework for personality psychology has been trait theory, which typically begins with the responses of adult lay subjects to self-descriptive words (Goldberg 1990) or sentences (Costa and MacCrae 1992) . The personality evidence in our data consists of responses to 15 sentences of the type used in trait methodology
The descriptive categories of trait analysis were developed by grouping the responses of a pool of subjects using factor analysis (Block 2010) .
12 The most specific, lowest level category is called a facet, of which there are generally thought to be about 25-30. Researchers agree that there is at least one higher-level category, factors, and the most common number of top levels is five, notably in the Five Factor Approach (FFA) (Lee and Ashton 2004) . A commonly-used version of the FFA describes the five factors as conscientiousness, agreeableness, emotional stability, extraversion, and openness to experience (Costa and McCrae 1992) .
Although early work focused on higher-level factor analysis, more recent work has found that the less aggregated facet level is more predictive (Judge et al. 2013; Paunonen and Ashton 2001) . Factors do remain useful because of data constraints as well as their use by much of the existing literature. For instance, each of the 15 questions in our data can be roughly associated with a factor, although, as will always be the case, most sentences load on more than one factor. Although a number of previous studies have examined the predictive value of FFA in employment settings, most of these studies are small and study highly specific outcomes. Useful conclusions, therefore, require meta-analyses, of which the most comprehensive and recent are Judge et al. (2013) and Barrick, Mount, and Judge (2001) . Both find that neuroticism usually has a negative effect on work outcomes and that, broadly speaking, all other factors have on average a positive effect, with conscientiousness the most important. However, there is a great deal of occupation and task specificity, with different factors predictive in different settings. The more recent of the two meta-analyses stresses that lower-level traits like facets are much more predictive than higher-level factors (Judge et al. 2013) .
Relatively little work has been done on the relation between FFA and criminal behavior due both to the relative newness of the FFA and to the unpopularity among criminologists of personality-based theories compared with theories based on factors such as social class (Andrews and Bonta 2014; Jones, Miller, and Lynam 2011) .
Within this literature, most studies do find that the population of interest differs from the population as a whole in some personality traits. Most commonly, people with criminal records or related traits score high in extraversion and neuroticism and low in conscientiousness and agreeableness (Jones, Miller, and Lynam 2011; O'Riordan and O'Connell 2014) . Since low neuroticism and high scores on other factors tend to predict good job outcomes, these findings suggest that people with criminal records may not perform well on the job.
Data Description and Summary Statistics
The data are provided by a hiring consultancy. The hiring consultancy's business model was to provide a number of corporate clients with hiring recommendations. In the process, the consultancy administered pre-employment exams, including the psychological questions examined here. It also collected other data on all applicants it processed, and merged its data with pre-existing administrative data compiled by the corporate clients.
The collated dataset contains information on all the applicants to low-skilled white-collar jobs-typically, customer service or sales representatives in a call center. The hiring consultancy anonymized the data and assigned each applicant a unique identifier. The identifier allows us to follow employees through their career at the firm in case they are hired. Unsuccessful applicants show up only once in the data. Successful applicants will typically occur repeatedly in the dataset, with reoccurrences indicating key HR events such as changes in position or termination. The data cover the period May 2008 to January 2014.
After dropping repeated observations referring to the same worker, we are left with 1,163,384 observations, each of which refers to a unique applicant. We further drop a comparatively small number of observations that pertain to establishments located outside of the United States. We are left with 1,144,575 observations; we will refer to this dataset as the "applicant pool." Table 1A provides summary statistics about the available variables for the applicant pool. Note that fields are often missing; for example, information on whether the applicant had a criminal record is only present for about 264,000 applicants, about 23 percent of the sample. Different clients requested that the consultancy collect different data and provided different elements of its own data for merging.
For most applicants we have data on schooling and prior jobs. The school variable is an indicator that equals 1 if the applicant has schooling above high school. In our sample, 27 percent of those with criminal records had more than high school compared with 40 percent of those without a record. Another study found that only about 10 percent of ex-offenders had more than a high school education (Yang 2016 ), so our sample appears to be more educated than ex-offenders as a whole, though it may be typical of those who apply for white-collar jobs.
Two variables indicate the applicant's stability on previous jobs. The fewer_short_jobs variable codes the answer to the question "In the last five years, how many full-time jobs have you held for less than six months, other than jobs you had while in school?" This variable takes value −1 when the answer was "None," −2 when the answer was "One job," all the way down to −5 when the answer was "More than 6 jobs." The variable longest_job codes the answer to the question "What is the longest amount of time that you ever worked for a single company?" This variable takes value 1 when the answer was "Not applicable/Less than 3 months," all the way up to 6 when the answer was "More than 5 years." The variable hired records whether the applicant was in fact hired and is present for all 1,144,575 applicant observations. The final piece of data on the applicant pool is position_id, one of 86 administratively-assigned numerical codes that appear to represent groups of jobs that were processed together by the provider. We discuss this field in more detail below. The applicant pool contains 110,023 observations that have data on criminal record, schooling, job stability, and position_id.
The variable pre_crim is a field that can be zero or one, depending on whether the applicant is recorded as having a criminal history. This field is recorded for only about 264,000 observations out of the entire sample. Because this is the key variable in this paper, we investigated possible reasons why it could be missing. We found that applicants are missing pre_crim if and only if they are missing position_id. This suggests that the occurrences in which pre_crim is missing reflect a deliberate decision by an employer not to collect criminal records information for a set of jobs indicated by a position_id rather than a selective response on the part of applicants. Furthermore, we examined applicants who were hired to check whether the establishment (firm_id) predicts the missing pre_crim and found that indeed there is a strong correlation. Establishments are sharply divided into two groups; those for which the pre_crim field is missing for almost all employees and those for which the pre_crim field is complete for almost all workers. This indicates that information on criminal background was fully recorded for some establishments and fully missing for the vast majority of the rest of the establishments in our sample.
Even if variation in information on criminal records resulted from deliberate employer choice, selection bias might occur if employers were more likely to ask for criminal records for certain jobs, such as those with high risk of crime or potential legal liability. Such employers would be less likely than average to hire applicants with a criminal record. However, no evidence of such selection is evident in our data. Although comprehensive data on employee crime is not available, the financial services sector appears, not surprisingly, to be especially vulnerable, 13 and FDIC insured firms have a strong incentive to conduct background checks.
14 In our sample, however, noninsurance financial services are actually more than average likely to be missing criminal records (Table 13) . Table 2A provides summary statistics for the subset of applicants who were in fact hired. We refer to this subset as the "hired pool." A comparison of Table 1A and Table 2A indicates that a number of additional variables are available for hired workers. For example, hired employees but not applicants have an anonymized identifier of their employer called firm_id, which we use as a control in our analyses. For hired applicants only, we have a location field that corresponds to the city and state in which the employee was hired. In order to preserve the anonymity of its clients, the consultancy masked the codes so that we were able to identify groups of employees who were hired at the same location, but not to identify the location itself. We do have reason to think that none of the firms, whether or not they collected criminal records information, were in a state that had Ban the Box legislation at the time of data collection. 15 The entire sample does seem slightly 13 One study found that 21 percent of all employee theft occurred in financial services (http://www.hiscoxbroker.com/news/press/hiscox-embezzlement-report/ (accessed September 28, 2016). This compares with 5 percent of the workforce in financial services (Henderson 2015) .
14 The Federal Deposit Insurance Act prohibits any person who has been convicted of any financial criminal offense from having any affiliation with an insured institution without the prior written consent of the FDIC. 12 U.S.C. 1829. 15 We can make a few educated guesses about the geographic distribution of our firms. The hiring consultancy told us that its client sites were overwhelmingly located in the South and continental West, and we have some corroboration for this. In addition to the location code, the data contain state and city fields that are empty for observations that have criminal record information, but had values for some of the observations that do not. Within this group of observations, 50.4% are in the West, 36% are in the South, 9% are in the Midwest, and 4% are in the East. This group of observations might have differed from the ones we analyze here, since by definition observations that had criminal records information were in states that at the time of application did not ban the box, while those for which criminal records information was missing might or might not have been in such states. However, any such difference is likely to be small. During the period of data collection, only four states covering about 5% of the US population banned the box for private employers (Hawaii, Rhode Island Massachusetts and Minnesota). Moreover, not one identifiable observation was in any of these four states.
skewed away from states that have since banned the box. 16 States that ban the box tend to be higher wage and have lower incarceration rates than those than do not. 17 The low wage jobs in our sample were unsurprisingly more likely to be located in lower wage areas, which also tend to have high incarceration rates. Thus, the bias in our sample was towards areas where the issue we study was actually likely to occur.
For hired applicants, the data contains a position_type field that takes one of five values describing the type of job held by the worker: agent, customer service, sales, technical support, or other. This field sometimes changes through a worker's tenure, presumably because the employer has shifted the worker to a different job. We retain the most recently-recorded position_type and use it as a control for occupation held in our analysis of the employee pool.
We do not have the position_type or location for applicants who were not hired, but for about 264,000 applicants we know the position_id. By examining applicants who were hired, we can see that position_id combines information about the type of job to which the applicant applied and the location variable. For example, almost all employees for whom position_id is coded 193 are customer service representatives in location 10. For many non-hired applicants, we were therefore able to reconstruct location code and position applied for. Table 3 provides a summary of the types of positions for which our applicant pool was vying based on the position_id codes.
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Restricting the applicant pool to observations that contain imputed location and imputed position, as well as the previously discussed variables, leaves 72,570 observations.
Turning to the hired pool, the total number of hired applicants is 58,977. Criminal record was only available for a subset of the sample, leaving 18,142 observations of hired workers. Although all applicants took the personality test, records were retained only for those hired. The test contained 3 proprietary questions and 15 FFA questions. Our 15 FFA questions were grouped by the consultancy's industrial psychologist into the FFA categories as follows. "Openness to experience" reflects the individual's degree of intellectual curiosity, creativity, and a preference for novelty and variety. "Conscientiousness" is the tendency to be organized and dependable, show self-discipline, act dutifully, aim for achievement, and prefer planned rather than spontaneous behavior. "Extraversion" includes energy, positive emotions, surgency, assertiveness, sociability, and talkativeness. "Agreeableness" is the tendency to be compassionate and cooperative rather than suspicious and antagonistic toward others. "Neuroticism" is the tendency to experience unpleasant emotions easily, such as anger, anxiety, depression, and vulnerability. Our variables neurtot, opentot, extratot, contot, and agreetot represent the sum total of answers chosen that support the respective personality factor of the FFA. These values can range from zero to three for each of these variables. 16 Five other states (Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, Oregon, and Vermont) passed laws after data collection, and about 14% of the US population now lives in a state that bans the box for private employers. Only one state that could be identified in the data, Oregon, now has a private employer Ban the Box law. It accounts for 1.2% of the US population though about 7.3% of all observations for which the state could be identified. 17 Of states with BTB laws, only Oregon is not in the upper half of state per capital income rankings, and it is number 29. www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/spi/2017/spi0317.htm 18 By comparing the values of position_type and position_id for those hired applicants for whom we have both, we are able to impute the position applied for to non-hired applicants. For some position_ids, hired applicants had several different initial position_types. We were told by the consultancy that a client would sometimes hold an "open call" for multiple position types. We used a position_id only if 95 percent of those hired had the same position_type, and then created a new variable, position_applied, which takes the value of the first position_type held for those hired and the position imputed from position_id for the non-hired.
In most of our estimates, the employee's position was an important control, and the limited availability of pre_crim reduced the number of observations of "Agent" and "Technical Support" below the level needed to draw useful inferences; we therefore dropped these positions. Although the number of observations of "Other" with pre_crim was reasonably large, it shrank when other variables like school were added. Since "Other" also represents a heterogeneous group, results would be hard to interpret, and we dropped it as well, leaving 17,256 observations (over 95 percent of all those hired for whom we had all other variables) represented solely by positions of sales or customer service workers. Finally, we eliminated observations which did not have all of our explanatory variables (job stability, school, and the psychometric variables) or outcome variables (related to turnover), leaving a total sample of 10,698 hired workers described in Table 2B . For consistency with our analysis of the hired, we limited our analysis of the applicant pool to sales and customer service workers, leaving 70,896 observations described in Table 1B .
The variable LOE records the length of employment, in days; it is censored for those workers who had not yet separated when the data collection ended. The variable TERM_ANY was constructed to take value 0 for any observation for which the cause of termination was not recorded and 1 otherwise; thus, from Table 2B , we see that 77 percent of our sample had separated from their job by the time data collection ended. For those workers, the cause of termination is known to be either voluntary (TERM_V) or involuntary (TERM_I). For 4.5 percent of our employees, the cause of termination was "misconduct."
Hiring Penalty Attached to Criminal Record and Selection Bias
We begin by examining the hiring process with attention to two questions: the hiring penalty attached to a criminal record and the resulting selection bias in the pool of employees with a criminal record.
We restrict attention to the sample of applicants for sales or customer service jobs for whom we have information about criminal record and all controls. Without any controls, we find that having a criminal record per se does not have a hiring penalty: a criminal history is actually positively correlated with the probability of being hired (Table 4 , column 1). This average effect can be gleaned directly from a comparison with pre_crim means in Tables 1 and 3, which shows that there are more individuals with a criminal background among the hired than in the applicant pool. The human capital controls alone do not change the positive effect of the criminal record. (Table 4 , column 2).
However, after controlling for either location or the position to which the applicant applied, the effect of a criminal record becomes negative (Table 4 , columns 3-4), as suggested by previous studies (Pager 2003; Holzer, Raphael and Stoll 2004; Holzer, Raphael and Stoll 2006; Agan and Starr 2016; Doleac and Hansen 2016) . With full controls other than the position interaction term (column 5), a criminal record lowers the probability of being hired about 4 percent from the 20 percent absolute probability of being hired in our sample. Comparable results for the sign and magnitude of the effect of a criminal record are found when a logit model of the same variables is estimated (Table 16 ).
This coefficient reversal from columns 1 and 2 to 3 through 6 suggests that those with a criminal history in our sample are applying to jobs and in locations with better hiring rates than those of the average position. To explore whether these higher hiring rates are for the job generally or represent a greater willingness to hire ex-offenders, we add an interaction of sales with pre_crim. The results, which are reported in column 6, suggest heterogeneity of the hiring penalty across positions. The baseline customer service positions have a penalty of 2.7 percent while sales positions have a hiring penalty of an additional 2.8 percent for a total of 5.5 percent. However, the logit version does not show a significant difference between the hiring penalty for the two jobs. (Table 16 , column 6).
Tenure and Separation of Employees with a Criminal Record
Job performance can include many potential measures, which may vary depending on the type of position. The consultancy from which we obtained the data informed us that their primary measures of performance are job tenure, separation, and reason for separation. Indeed, from the perspective of firms, tenure is an important measure of employment outcomes, as finding and training a new worker can be very expensive. 19 Further, these measures can be applied across virtually all positions. Of course, there are many other potentially important measures of job performance. However, due to data availability we focus on job tenure, separation, and reason for separation, and leave to future research other potentially important measures. We restrict analysis to the 10,698 observations for which all of our explanatory variables and outcome measures are available.
To measure whether employees with a criminal record have longer tenure, we construct a variable called length of employment (LOE). This variable measures the number of days that elapse between the hire date and the termination date or the date of final data entry, whichever is smaller. The average length of employment in out sample is 169 days. Table 2B . Note that this variable is subject to right-censoring. Table 5 takes a first pass at the data by regressing LOE on pre_crim. For the sample of both sales and customer service employees and with controls only for location, position and firm, the estimates indicate that employees with a criminal background stay employed on average 19 days longer than those who do not have a criminal background (Table 5 , column 1).
LOE combines the effect of voluntary and involuntary terminations. Involuntary termination is by definition associated with weaker performance, while studies indicate that voluntary termination is most common among highest and lowest performers. 20 The expected sign of the human capital variables is thus ambiguous, since departing employees include both the best and the worst. Schooling does not predict LOE, but the coefficients on both job history variables are positive and statistically significant in all specifications. (Table 5 , columns 2-4) Job history and school together reduce the LOE associated with pre_crim by about two days. (Table 5 , columns 1-2). Controlling for proprietary psychometric variables and FFA reduce the additional LOE of ex-offenders to about 16.5 and 17.5 days respectively. (Table 5 , columns 3-4). The effect of the psychometric variables will be considered at more length in the next section.
To quantify the economic significance of longer LOE, we obtained estimates from the consultancy on the average cost of replacing a worker found in our dataset. This figure amounted to $4,000 per termination. At average values of other variables, a worker without a criminal record lasts 167 days while a worker with a record lasts 183 days. 21 Since the average wage for call center employees is about $30,000 per year, this amounts to a savings of about 2.5% of wages per year for these employees. 22 However, if applicants with records were hired in greater numbers, their quality, and therefore the associated employer savings, might well drop.
The LOE of employees varies strikingly with the job held (Table 5 , columns 1-4). Because the effect is so large, we examine the possibility that different models underlie each job (Table 5 columns 5-12). With only location and firm as controls, sales people with criminal records last about 18.5 days longer than others, while customer service agents with a record last about 21 days longer. Schooling has no effect in any estimate. The job stability and school variables together reduce the effect of a criminal record slightly. The psychometric variables will be discussed in the next section.
We next conduct a more refined analysis to account both for different types of separation and for the censoring that results from the unknown ultimate length of employment of those workers who were employed when the data collection ended. Table 6 provides the estimated coefficients of a Cox proportional hazard model in which only voluntary separations are counted as "failures." About 77 percent of all workers had separated by the end of data collection, and about 55 percent of all separations were voluntary.
For the whole pool, a criminal background has a consistently negative and statistically significant impact on voluntary separations, suggesting that having a criminal background makes an employee less likely to leave voluntarily (Table 6 , columns 1-4). This result is not surprising: workers with a criminal record presumably have fewer external labor market opportunities. Again, the coefficient on job type is highly significant (Table 6 , columns 1-4) and we therefore also examine each job separately (Table 6 , columns 5-12). A criminal record decreases the voluntary separation rates of customer service employees more than that of sales employees, though both effects are significant and negative (Table 6 , columns 5-12). Like LOE, voluntary departures are driven by a mix of high and low performers, and thus the expected signs on the human capital coefficients are ambiguous. Schooling seldom predicts voluntary separation for either the entire sample or the separate estimates for sales and customer service, and when it does its significance is at the 10 percent level (Table 6 , columns 2-4, 6-8, and 10-12). One of the job history variables, longest_job, is significant and negative for the whole sample and sales, but is insignificant for customer service; the other, fewer_short_jobs is significant (and positive) for customer service only and insignificant otherwise. (Table 6 , columns 2-4, 6-8, and 10-12). Two psychometric variables are predictive for sales and none are predictive for customer service-we discuss these in more detail later. Table 7 provides the estimated coefficients of a Cox proportional hazard model in which only involuntary terminations are counted as failures. Since involuntary termination is associated with lower quality workers, coefficients should now have the sign associated with lower quality. A criminal background does not predict involuntary terminations in the whole sample (Table 7, columns 1-4). As expected, involuntary terminations are more likely among workers who would be regarded as lower quality by traditional measures: better schooling (Table 7 , columns 2-4) and higher job stability (Table 7 , columns 2-4) reduce involuntary termination. Again, the coefficient on a sales position is highly significant (Table 7 , columns 1-4), so we examine the two jobs separately. A criminal record does not predict involuntary termination for customer service jobs (Table 7 , columns 9-12) but is predictive for sales jobs in all specifications with human capital controls ( Table 7 , columns 5-8). Both job stability variables are negative and significant in all specifications in both positions. Schooling is borderline significant for customer service but not for sales. Again, the psychometric predictors are somewhat different for the two jobs, a finding we discuss further in the next Section.
So far, the evidence on tenure has shown that having a criminal background makes an employee less likely to leave voluntarily and likely to have a longer tenure. Employees with a criminal record are no more likely to be terminated involuntarily in customer service positions, but more likely in some specifications in a sales position. Since involuntary turnover is associated with weaker performance and turnover costly, this evidence taken together suggests that customer service employees with a criminal background are, at least at the current margin, a promising pool for employers. Sales employees present a slightly more mixed picture, since they do appear to have higher rates of involuntary terminations.
To further explore the cost of involuntary terminations, we examine a subset of these terminations, those that involve misconduct. Note that the concept of "misconduct," as used in the human resource setting, corresponds to the definition found in unemployment insurance (UI) law. Employers keep records of misconduct discharges for purpose of UI reporting: if an employer discharges an employee for misconduct, the employee receives reduced UI or none at all, and thus the discharge has a lesser effect on the employer's UI premiums. Although the term "misconduct" seems to imply severe misbehavior, it may also include much lesser failings such as excessive absenteeism or even the use of profanity.
23
Misconduct discharges are a relatively rare event, occurring in 4.5 percent of our sample of the hired. (Table 2B ) Termination for misconduct is generally more common in sales, occurring in 5.9 percent of sales positions compared with 3.1 percent of customer service positions. For the sample of both positions, a criminal record is associated with a higher risk of misconduct (Table  8 , columns 1-4). Although having a sales position is not significant (Table 8 , columns 1-4), we examine each job separately. A criminal record appears to increase the risk of misconduct for sales jobs but not for customer service. (Table 8 , columns 5-12). Sales workers with a criminal record are about 34% more likely to be terminated for misconduct than those without. 24 Our results suggest that all employees with a criminal record have longer tenure and lower voluntary turnover than other employees. Customer service employees with a criminal record are also no more likely to be terminated involuntarily or for misconduct. Sales employees with a record display a more complicated pattern. The value of their longer tenure is at least partly offset by their slightly higher rates of involuntary discharge and their clearly higher rates of misconduct discharge.
The discrepancy between sales and customer service jobs is particularly striking since the hiring penalty seems to be greater for sales jobs (Table 4 , column 6): despite the higher degree of selection, more misconduct is observed. Further questions are raised. Do different types of individuals with a criminal history apply for each job, or do the environments of the sales jobs increase the chances that those with a record will engage in misconduct? Is a more general principle at work: does an environment in which misconduct risks are generally elevated have an even greater effect on employees with criminal records than on other workers? In any case, we consider our finding a cautionary tale of the risks of drawing broad conclusions based on one type of position or industry.
Our findings provide an interesting comparison to those of the only other study of the job performance of ex-offenders, which was conducted on armed forces data. (Lundquist, Pager, Strader 2016) . Military personnel with the most serious criminal records appeared to be no more likely than personnel without a criminal record to leave for performance-related reasons, including misconduct, and to be superior to others on several performance dimensions. Interestingly, military personnel with less serious criminal records performed worse than other personnel across various measures of attrition and promotion, including misconduct. As the authors of that study note, this initially puzzling difference may be explained by military screening procedures, which add extra scrutiny for applicants with criminal records, and more stringent checks for more serious offenses. Perhaps the civilian firms in our study should consider using different screening methods for customer service and sales jobs.
We next compare the level of misconduct among firms that request criminal records with the level among those that do not. In Table 9 , our sample includes both firms that do and do not ask for criminal information and we include a variable indicating whether the employer had this information at the time of hiring. We find that whether the employer had information about an employee's criminal record does not predict the likelihood of employee misconduct.
This result may seem surprising, since a criminal record is predictive of misconduct, at least for those entering sales positions. Table 10 examines the hiring of firms who do not use information about criminal records. Columns 1 and 2 examines correlates of a criminal record within the applicant pool. Those with criminal records have more short jobs, though a longer longest job, than those without records. They also have less schooling than those without records, although this association is weaker controlling for location. Columns 3 and 4 show the correlates of being hired without criminal record information: these employees tend to have more school, a shorter tenure in their longest job, and fewer short job, all of which are associated with not having a criminal record. Although any firms in our sample that declined to use criminal records information did so voluntarily, this finding is consistent with the result of studies that find that Ban the Box legisla tion increases statistical discrimination based on characteristics associated with a criminal record. (Agan and Starr 2016; Doleac and Hansen 2016) . However, we are not able to examine the effect of non-use of criminal record information on characteristics such as race, since these factors were not provided to us.
Personality, Criminal Background and Job Performance
The key finding of the previous section is that employees with a criminal record perform as well or better than those without a record in some jobs, while exhibiting higher levels of misconduct discharge in others. This result raises a number of further questions. To what extent is this difference in outcomes driven by differences in individual characteristics, and to what extent by differences in job characteristics? Are there any individual characteristics that can be used to predict which people with criminal records are at risk, reducing or eliminating the incentive to use criminal record information in hiring?
The psychometric tests that are now commonly used in hiring provide a potential approach to answering these questions. Our data contain two kinds of psychometric questions, 15 FFA questions and three proprietary questions. Fifteen questions are considered valid for assessment at the factor level (Donnellan et al. 2006) , but that number is not enough to distinguish among the 30 or more categories at the facet level, and is below the preferred level for comprehensive assessment. We therefore regard our analysis of these questions as suggestive of how useful psychometric testing could be in this context rather than as an exhaustive consideration of the issues.
We first examine the extent to which the two jobs, sales and customer service, may differ in ways other than the outcomes for workers with a criminal record. To do this we examine whether in each of our jobs the psychometric variables have the same association with our two measures of poor performance, misconduct and involuntary termination. 25 As preliminary matter, the psychometric variables perform fairly well, at least in comparison with other explanatory variables. For example, when the psychometric variables are included in the misconduct estimate for sales, the coefficients on the significant psychometric variables are about as large or larger (confidence regress=.61; con2=.22; agree3=15) than that on pre_crim (.28-.31) ( Table 8, columns 7-8) .
Looking more closely, we find that the psychometric variables show different patterns in each job, summarized in Table 18 . In the misconduct estimates for sales employees, two FFA questions, con2 and agree3, have significant positive coefficients, with agree3 extremely large and highly significant. In comparison, in the misconduct estimates for customer service, the FFA variables have less predictive value and neither of the two FFA variables that are borderline significant for customer service is significant in the sales regression. (Table 18 , columns 3-4). In our estimates of involuntary termination, four of the fifteen FFA variables are significant for sales and four for customer service, but no FFA variable is significant in both estimates. (Table 18 , columns 1-2)
In addition to the FFA, we examine three measures based on proprietary psychometric tests of the hiring consultancy. Again, the predictive power of these variables is not always the same for customer service and sales. One, confidence_regress, is a measure of overconfidence that is notable for combining self-reports and objective information. Applicants were asked how confident they felt in their technical skills without knowing that they would later take a computer test. Confidence_regress is based on the difference between the applicant's reported selfconfidence and his or her actual performance on the later test. Confidence_regress is highly significant in both the misconduct and the involuntary termination estimates for sales; it is significant for customer service only in predicting involuntary termination and not misconduct. (Table 18) . A second proprietary variable, rulebreaker, is a forced choice variation of the first two FFA conscientiousness questions. Rulebreaker is significant in predicting involuntary termination and misconduct for customer service but not for sales. (Table 18 ) A third measure is badservice, which is meant to predict poor customer service skills. Badservice had some predictive power for misconduct in customer service but not in sales. (Table 18 ). These differences raise the possibility that differences in job characteristics rather than differences in the applicant pool, might drive the different outcomes observed for employees with a criminal record. Perhaps something in the sales environment affects everyone, but those with criminal records more so.
We next examine whether employees with criminal records in sales have any specific psychometric characteristics that might explain why their outcomes differ from both sales people of all types and customer service people with criminal records. (Table 17 ). We regress each psychometric variable on position, criminal record, the interaction of the two. The position term is significant, usually highly, in 17 of 18 regressions: sales people and customer service workers clearly have different psychological profiles. A criminal record is significant in 6 of 18 estimates and the interaction term is significant in 5 of 18.
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We thus observe two potential explanations for the differences observed, differences in worker characteristics and differences in job characteristics. However, these present hypotheses to be tested by future work. The observational nature of our data prevents us from drawing any conclusions about causality, since selection both by workers and by firms affects the assignment of workers with various personality traits to each job and without random assignment of workers to jobs, no causal conclusions can be drawn.
We finally examine whether these psychometric variables can be used to reduce the value of a criminal record in predicting job outcomes by explaining why sales employees who have criminal records have worse job outcomes than those who do not.
27 Table 12 examines the psychometric correlates of a criminal record in the hired population. The FFA questions appear well correlated with criminal background and our results generally correspond with the prior literature.
28 Of the 15 FFA questions, 7 are predictive in both specifications. (Table 12 , columns 4 & 6). One of the three proprietary questions, badservice, is positively correlated with a criminal record. Table 19 columns 2-4 compares psychometric variables as predictors of a criminal record and of poor employment outcomes. Since a criminal record, involuntary termination, and misconduct are all undesirable outcomes, we might expect to see psychometric variables tending to have the same signs in both. However, Table 19 indicates that only one question with a 26 The five psychometric measures for which the interaction term is significant do not correspond to the measures that are associated with poor performance outcomes. (Tables 7, 8, columns 7-8 and Table 17 ). The sales*criminal record interaction is negatively associated with confidence regress, but confidence_regress is positive and significantly associated with both involuntary termination and misconduct. The sales*criminal record interaction is positively associated with con3, but con3 is unrelated to misconduct and has a significant negative association with involuntary termination. The interaction term is significant and negatively associated with variables extra2 and extra3, but extra2 and extra3 are unrelated to either work outcome. The interaction term is significant and negatively associated with agree3, and while agree3 is significant and negatively associated with involuntary termination it is positively associated with misconduct. However, without random assignment of workers to jobs, no causal conclusions can be drawn from this. 27 We restrict our analysis to the hired pool because personality variables are available only for this group. We report the results for the sample restricted to sales and customer service jobs. Results for the whole hired pool are consistent and are provided in Tables 14 and 15 of Appendix 1. 28 See Appendix 2.
significant association with misconduct in sales positions, agree3, has a significant association of the same sign in the criminal record estimate. A second question significantly associated with misconduct, confidence_regress, is not significantly associated with a criminal record, and the third, con2, is not significant in the criminal record estimate. Similarly, Table 19 shows only a minimal relationship between the predictors of involuntary termination in sales positions and a criminal record.
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With no clear relationship between the predictors in the three sets of estimates, the expected effect on pre_crim of adding the psychometric variables to outcome estimates is indeterminate. In the misconduct estimate for sales, the inclusion of the proprietary variables lowers the coefficient on pre_crim slightly while the inclusion of the FFA variables increases the coefficient on pre_crim also very slightly. (Table 8 , columns 6-8) In the involuntary termination estimate for sales, the reverse is true: the inclusion of the proprietary variables raises the coefficient on pre_crim slightly while the inclusion of the FFA lowers slightly the coefficient on pre_crim (Table 7 , columns 6-8).
The implications of the failure of the psychometric variables to reduce meaningfully the predictive power of a criminal record is unclear. Prior work often found that traits associated with criminal behavior were those that tended to produce worse work outcomes. 30 In the talent analytics setting, an association between to the two sets of predictors would actually have some desirable consequences, since it would enable psychometric testing to reduce the usefulness of a criminal record. Although our psychometric variables had some association with both a criminal record and work outcomes, they did not really reduce the value of a criminal record in predicting bad outcomes. The pessimistic implication of these findings is that psychometrics is not yet useful for eliminating the predictive value of a criminal record. The optimistic implication is that even simple psychometric tests have some predictive value, and the development of better tests may eventually eliminate the incentive for employers to use criminal records in all jobs.
In sum, our analysis of psychometric variables suggests two interesting lines of future inquiry. First, the different predictors of poor outcomes in the two jobs, in combination with the apparent lack of any strong differentiation between sales people with criminal records and other workers, suggests that bad outcomes for sales people with records may be driven by job characteristics, and might be reduced by deliberating steering those with records into appropriate jobs. Second, the psychometric variables have a reasonable degree of association with both a criminal record and job outcomes. However, in our data they do not reduce the value of a criminal record, and further research is required to determine whether they could do so.
Conclusions
Using a unique source of data, we hope to have shed some light on actual firm hiring behavior and the job performance of those with a criminal record. In particular, we find that 29 Only one question, con3, is consistently significant and of the same sign in predicting involuntary termination and a criminal record. Extra1 is borderline significant in involuntary termination though more significantly associated with a criminal record. One question significantly associated with involuntary termination, confidence regress, is not significantly associated with a criminal record; while two questions, open2 and agree3, have the opposite signs the involuntary terminations and criminal record. 30 High neuroticism and low conscientiousness and agreeableness usually lead to worse work outcomes (Judge et al. 2013; Barrick, Mount, and Judge 2001 ) and more criminal behavior (Jones, Miller, and Lynam 2011; O'Riordan and O'Connell 2014) . Only extraversion usually increases both criminal behavior while improving work outcomes. employees with a criminal record have a much longer tenure and are less likely to quit their jobs voluntarily than other workers. We further find that in certain jobs, employees with a criminal record are no more likely than those without a record to leave their job involuntarily or for reasons of misconduct. These workers with a criminal background appear to be no worse than, and possibly even better than, workers without such a background. In our data, this low-risk job is customer service.
In other jobs, however, employees with a criminal record do appear more likely to leave for reasons of misconduct. In our data, the high-risk job is sales, and we conjecture that whatever factors create the overall high misconduct rate observed in sales jobs may have an even greater effect on employees with criminal records.
The precise cost of this excess risk is highly speculative: the term "misconduct" encompasses behavior ranging from excessive absenteeism to a variety of criminal conduct. Some suggest that employers are primarily concerned about large negligent hiring judgments for violent acts (Walker and Miller. 2009; Platt, 1993) . No systematic study has been conducted nor aggregate statistics collected, and supposed evidence that evidence of a criminal record has a major effect on negligent hiring costs is basically folklore.
31 Large judgments have indeed been rendered for the acts of employees with criminal backgrounds, 32 but also for the acts of employees without a criminal record.
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Employer focus on catastrophic judgments may result from the well-established human propensity to overestimate low probability events (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) . The cost of high stakes lawsuits should not be dismissed, and we discuss policy towards them below, but the primary employer losses from misconduct are probably more pedestrian. Only one published study has any bearing on this and, though small and highly specific, suggests that the work-related misconduct of workers with criminal records is on average less serious than that of other workers.
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With this in mind, we use dishonesty, a serious but non-catastrophic type of employee misconduct, as a basis for a rough estimate of the cost-benefit calculation facing an employer. The National Retail Federation estimates the loss from each dishonest employee case is about $1,546. (National Retail Federation 2015) . Only sales workers with a criminal record pose an excess misconduct risk: about 5.9% of sales workers with a criminal record are discharged for misconduct compared with 3.1% of other sales workers, a difference of 2.8%. 35 An employer who hired a worker with a criminal record rather than a worker without a record increased its expected theft-related costs 31 Hickox, Stacy A. and Mark V. Roehling. 2013.One often-cited article claims employers have lost 72 percent of negligent hiring cases with an average settlement of more than $1.6 million It provides no evidence as to the use of a criminal background in such verdicts, no data on the frequency of such cases, and for the evidence it does provide it cites a broken web link to what appears to have been either a background check provider or a trade magazine (Connerley, Arvey, and Bernardy 2001 34 Roberts et al (2007) examined a birth cohort of about 900 New Zealand residents who had been tracked from birth to age 26. Adolescent criminal convictions were unrelated to committing counterproductive activities at work in general, and were actually negatively related to more serious counterproductive work behaviors such as fighting or stealing.
35 Note that these rates are unadjusted raw numbers. The hazard ratios from our Cox estimate cannot be used here because Cox estimation does not produce a baseline hazard rate. However, the hazard ratio implied by these raw numbers is higher than the Cox hazard ratio, and the estimate in text is likely to be of the right order of magnitude but on the higher side.
by about 2.8% of $1,546, or $43. The same employer saved about $746 in turnover costs on that worker. Of course, misconduct includes other behavior both more and less serious than theft, but the gap between $43 and $746 is large. Only better data than anyone now collects can determine whether the expected cost of misconduct exceeds the expected gains from longer tenure.
Our results are subject to an important qualification: our estimates were made on employees, in other words, on those applicants who had been filtered through a hiring process that discriminated based on their criminal record. If discrimination against these applicants decreased, either by employer choice or through legislation, the employee group would change, and the new group of employees with records might not exhibit tenures as long as those we observe.
We thus do not purport to generalize about the entire pool of applicants with a criminal record. However, our evidence is highly suggestive about the value of marginal customer service hires. Our estimates suggest that the average customer service worker with a criminal record is a better deal for the employer than the average worker without a record. Unless the pool of the hired with criminal records had a disproportionate number of high value employees, it appears likely that the marginal customer service worker with a record is also a better deal, and employers should be hiring more of them.
The situation with respect to sales workers is more complicated: the value of the average sales worker with a criminal record may or may not be higher than that of workers without a record, We cannot say because of uncertainties about the cost of misconduct.
Despite these limitations from the observational nature of our data, we believe it provides some useful evidence for policy analysis. Observational studies may well be all that is available for some time. A field experiment to examine these issues is unusually hard to conduct. Persuading employers to conduct a randomized hiring trial is difficult even to test the most innocuous hypothesis, such as the value of an additional year of education. Such an experiment is incomparably more difficult when employers are asked to hire individuals who they may believe, however wrongly, to be dangerous. Even observational data is extremely hard to obtain, since employers may fear exposure to liability if it appears that they are hiring individuals with a propensity to misconduct. We therefore regard the limitations of observational data as a price worth paying to obtain at least some insight into an area of great policy consequence.
Our findings are not simple, and neither are their policy implications. Finding gainful employment for ex-offenders is an important public priority: without such employment, recidivism is almost inevitable, at great cost to both the individual and the community. At the same time, employers are concerned that employing ex-offenders may carry risks, and our study does not entirely dispel those fears.
Ban the Box laws have come to dominate the policy discussion of how to improve the employment prospects of people with criminal records. All Ban the Box laws force employers to assess applicants initially without information about a criminal record. All allow employers to obtain criminal records at a late stage in the hiring process, though some restrict the uses to which that an employer can ultimately put criminal record. For example, sometimes the criminal record can be used only if the offense is related to the nature of the job.
The crucial prohibition of early-stage access is based on the view that employer decisions are distorted by confirmation bias: Hiring managers who have access to a criminal record early on will view all subsequent information through the prism of that information, causing them to see job credentials as less valuable than the same credentials in the application of an individual without a record. Ban the Box rules invert any confirmation bias: hiring managers do not see the criminal record until they have already decided the individual is qualified and then, it is hoped, interpret the criminal record to conform to their view of the applicant as a potentially valuable employee.
Our study may provide some qualified support for the information delay provision of Ban the Box laws. Customer service employees with a criminal record have substantially longer tenure and no higher involuntary discharge or misconduct rates than other employees. This suggests that employers might find it profitable to hire more ex-offenders for customer service jobs, and in turn implies that they may not be accurately assessing the costs and benefits of these applicants. These potential benefits of information delay rules must be weighed against a potential cost. Our finding is based on the outcomes of employees who were hired with knowledge of their criminal record, and who are probably better qualified than the applicant pool as a whole. Their much higher tenure may suggest that, on the margin, employers are failing to hire some good employees, but as employers dip deeper into the applicant pool, quality may drop. Information delay rules force employers to incur the costs of interviewing even obviously low quality applicants who the employer might ultimately rationally choose not to hire.
In addition, the case for information delay is strongest for sales jobs. Although sales employees with a criminal record do have longer tenures, they also have higher misconduct rates. We can make only the roughest estimates of whether the benefits of longer tenure are outweighed by the costs of poor performance and misconduct, and our results for sales provide less clear support for the confirmation bias hypothesis.
All Ban the Box laws permit employers eventually to obtain a criminal record, but some contain a second provision that allows an employer to act on this information only if the criminal conduct bears a relationship to the job for which the applicant is being considered. Presumably such provisions would allow an employer to consider financial crimes when hiring for positions involving access to money but not access to drugs, and the reverse for drug offenses. Our results suggest that these provisions may problematic. In our data, sales employees with a criminal record were at greater risk for involuntary termination and misconduct. The telephone sales work in this study provides relatively little opportunity for misconduct with a causal nexus to a specific criminal behavior, and it seems possible that the employee misconduct here is far more mundane and consists of insubordination, excessive tardiness and absenteeism. Only further research can settle this, but until it does, restrictions based on job-relatedness seem unwise. This conclusion is reinforced by the selection issue in our sample, which consisted of those actually screened through the hiring process. We can draw no conclusions about the pool as a whole except to say that it is likely riskier than the individuals actually hired. Thus, our work provides no support for mandatory restrictions on the use of criminal records and some reasons for concern about them.
Our study also suggests that the policy menu should be broadened beyond Ban the Box to include policies that balance the value of expanded hiring against the risk, in some instances, of higher misconduct.
1. Incentives for private information gathering. Our estimates do provide some reason for thinking that employers may be able to predict misconduct without using criminal records. First, some of the psychometric measures in our data predicted misconduct better than did a criminal record, although our simple these measures alone did not eliminate the predictive value of a record. Better psychometric instruments are needed. Second, in our data, the predictive value of a criminal record was limited to one position, sales. Though this may be related to the generally higher misconduct rate in sales, further work by employers or other researchers is needed to explore this and other mechanisms that might identify the jobs in which a criminal record was likely to pose a risk of elevated misconduct. Finally, criminal records come in many forms, and with greater detail about the nature of an individual's history, employers may be able to make more nuanced use of a criminal record than they do at present. In brief, public policy could encourage employers to look closely at their own workforce to see where the risks actually are or to develop additional predictive tools, either psychometric or job-related.
A wide variety of measures could increase incentives, or at least remove disincentives, for employers to re-examine their assumptions about applicants with criminal records by studying their own workforce. The current Work Opportunity Tax Credit is only available to who hire exfelons within one year after their conviction or release from prison even though employers appear to discriminate against ex-offenders long after release or conviction and some employers apply a hiring penalty to those with misdemeanor or even arrest record.
Public information provision.
A different approach would use public mechanisms to provide employers with improved information about the risks posed by individual applicants. Most states make some provision for the sealing or expungement of criminal records, but jurisdictions vary greatly in their eligibility requirements for expungement. Most do not permit expungements for serious convictions, regardless of the time that has passed since conviction. Mississippi only permits expungement of drug possession convictions of the person was under twenty-six at the time of the offense. Illinois does not allow expungement if the conviction resulted in a jail or prison sentence. (Jacobs 2015, 117) . 36 Studies of recidivism patterns have suggested that these statutes may be too restrictive (Blumstein and Nakamura 2009 ) and this evidence could be used to expand the offenses that can be sealed by court order or expunged.
Yet with the development of technology and criminal background checking companies, it is unlikely that even records that had been expunged would be truly confidential. 37 As an alternative to mechanisms such as expungement, some states such as New York, have established certificates of rehabilitation, which preserves the public record of a conviction.
38 Such a system allows employers to more easily identify applicants with a low risk of recidivism.
3. Employer liability concerns. An alternative set of policies addresses employer concerns about liability for negligent hiring. Several states, notably Texas, have restricted the use of a criminal record as the foundation for a negligent hiring suit.
39 Some courts have suggested that 36 In contrast to these restrictive rules, Massachusetts limits the time period of criminal records to 10 years following disposition for felony convictions and five years for misdemeanor convictions. Mass. Senate Bill 2583. Texas allows first-time offenders to receive nondisclosure orders for offenses committed on or after September 1, 2015 as long as their offenses did not include sex crimes, domestic abuse, or other serious violence. Tex. Senate Bill 1902. 37 The First Amendment poses an obstacle to preventing media or commercial information vendors from storing and publicizing criminal records, even if they were expunged. (Jacobs 2015, 127) . Furthermore, courts have held that expunged records must not necessarily be kept confidential. See G. D. v. Kenny, 205 N.J. 275, 291, 15 A.3d 300, 309 (N.J. 2011) . harm caused by an employee with a criminal record is not necessarily foreseeable, so employers will not always be held liable for negligent hiring just because an employee has a prior criminal record. 40 Our study does suggest reasons for caution in drafting these laws. On the one hand, the relatively small increase in misconduct we observe, in combination with the relatively minor nature of much misconduct, does not clearly justify the presumption in many states that hiring someone with a criminal record is always negligent. Still, our elevated misconduct finding suggests that limitation contain exceptions, such as those provided under Texas law, that allow for consideration of a record under some circumstances.
Limitations on liability for negligent hiring leave the small group of those injured with no remedy. An alternative reform of negligent hiring liability would address the virtually complete unavailability of insurance for employees with criminal records. Private insurance is all but nonexistent, and the Federal Bonding Program now provides only the most limited insurance. The bond insures the employer for theft, forgery, larceny, or embezzlement but not for the violent offenses that would lead to the greatest negligent hiring liability. It covers only between $5,000-$25,000 in losses, and is only available for six months, although the contracted insurer offers subsequent coverage with the premium paid by the employer. 41 To provide greater hiring incentives, the insurable amounts, the period of coverage and the misconduct covered might be increased. Some researchers have suggested making the bonds more accessible to the employer community, perhaps by decreasing the paperwork burden associated with these bonds. (Holzer, Raphael, & Stoll 2003) . Another policy that has not, to our knowledge, been explored, would require insurance companies to cover those with criminal records while allowing them to charge premiums based on experience-ratings. This would not only reduce employer reluctance to hire but would provide valuable data on the actual liability costs.
What can be said is that employees with a criminal record who successfully navigate the current hiring have much longer tenures than other workers. When hired for customer service jobs, these employees are no more likely than others to leave their job involuntarily or for reasons of misconduct. and the hiring penalty for such workers may be too high. However, we also find that in sales jobs, employees with a criminal record are more likely to be discharged for misconduct than other workers in those jobs. Even in customer service jobs, the better performance of those with a criminal record might not persist through the entire applicant pool. Better psychometric testing has some promise for obviating the need to use criminal records, but that promise is not realized in our simple instrument. Our complex results suggest the value of focusing public policy on incentives for employers to develop tools, psychometric and otherwise, to identify where the true risk groups are. 40 Williams v. Feather Sound Inc., 386 So. 2d 1238, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (" [T] here are many persons…with prior criminal records who are now good citizens. To say that an employer can never hire a person with a criminal record at the risk of being held liable for his tortious assault flies in the face of the premise that society must make a reasonable effort to rehabilitate those who have gone astray.") However, there is uncertainty about the extent of the similarity between prior offenses and the conduct causing the new harm required to hold an employer liable for negligent hiring based on the employee's prior convictions. 9. Tables   Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Applicant Pool   Table 1A : Applicant Pool, All Table 7  Table 7  Table 8  Table 8  cols 11-12 cols 7-8 cols 11-12 cols 7-8 school, job stability, crim.rec., firm, location Table 12 , cols 5 -6 Table 7 , cols 7-8 Table 8 , cols 7-8 school, job stability, crim.rec., firm, location
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